Following from the critiques of moral relativism advanced by philosophers such as Gilbert Harman and J.L. Mackie, the author explores philosophical challenges that educators face in philosophy courses. Specifically, the author accounts for the new wave of moral relativism and its effects on classroom discussions in philosophy courses. The purpose of this paper is to outline various pedagogical approaches that help with identifying student relativism. Unlike philosophical relativism, student relativism can be identified as an unreflective response to or attitude towards (...) moral philosophical issues. The author contends that the proper identification of student relativism will allow educators to effectively respond to and be able to decipher its philosophical validity in order to improve students’ ability to comprehend philosophical discourse. In addition to the identification of various aspects student relativism the author seeks to qualify the ways in which it functions in student college life. (shrink)

Three standard tasks undertaken by applied ethicists engaged in the public policy process are identifying value issues, clarifying concepts and meanings, and analyzing arguments. I urge that these should be expanded to include making specific moral judgments and advocating positions and policies. Three objections to philosophers/ethicists' engagement in the formation of public policy are advanced and evaluated: philosophers necessarily do public policy badly, doing it at all compormises one's integrity as a seeker after truth, and frequently participation is in the (...) service of a repressive status quo that is structured simultaneously to preclude radical change and to co-opt ethicists. finally, however, I argue that those who would be ‘applied ethicists’ cannot avoid all participation in some form of a public policy process; that engagement holds the hope as well for improved ethical theory; that the preferred form of participation is frequently from outside of establishment bodies; and that wherever philosophers do involve themselves in policy formulation, this is best done in the expanded sense urged at the outset. Keywords: applied ethics, moral reasoning, public policy CiteULike Connotea Del.icio.us What's this? (shrink)

For the most part, philosophers have regarded moral truth as propositional and as what follows from the application of moral theory to particular problematic cases. Here I maintain that this is not a useful way of conceiving moral truth in bioethics. Rather, we are better off conceiving of moral truth as what emerges from a process of inquiry conducted in a certain manner. There are four elements to this process: (1) careful exploration of the embedded norms of medical practice, research, (...) and delivery; (2) recognition of the irreducible plurality of ultimate moral values within and between these practices; (3) the cultivation and exercise of moral imagination; and (4) the attainment, however temporarily, of wide reflective equilibrium. This process, I argue, is reflected in the way bioethics is most fruitfully practiced, and it is further to be recommended by being true to the character of moral conscientiousness generally. This analysis suggests that moral truth is "unstable," but that this is not a bad thing. Further, the implication is drawn that moral theory would be better informed if formulated on the basis of paying more attention to lived moral practices. (shrink)

Medical decisions concerning noncompetent patients that are most morally problematical are those that involve life and death choices. In making these choices for others, I urge that decision-makers carefully attend to the degree and history of a person's noncompetence, and distinguish four relevant categories of competence: partial, potential, lost and never possessed. Attending to these will help enable us to sort out when and how autonomous choice is possible and desirable and when and how to rely upon a judgment of (...) a patient's best interests instead. This conflict is explored with particular reference to the Quinlan, Fox and Saikewicz cases. I argue that respect for autonomy, wherever possible, has presumptive priority, and that it is more often possible than frequently supposed. On the other hand, the notion of autonomous choice itself is perverted when forced upon inappropriate cases, such as those presented by the never competent. Here it is not merely legitimate, but inescapable to use a best interest criterion that ignores autonomy in making treatment decisions. Specific cases in which these normally distinct guidelines for decision-making concur, conflict and need resolution are discussed. In the end it is often more important to determine who will choose than by what substantive criteria he or she will be guided. In considering this issue, I try to show that the substantive criteria have implications for who the proper decision-makers are in many problematical cases. (shrink)

Considerable scholarship over the last dozen years has greatly increased our understanding of Apology and Crito. However, the knottiest problem between these dialogues--the frequently noted apparent contradiction between Apology 29c-30c and Crito 51b-c, between Socrates’ pledge to disobey a court order to give up philosophy and his argument that legal authority absolutely obligates a citizen to obedience--is far from being resolved. In the end I argue that this contradiction is unresolved, despite numerous ingenious attempts to eliminate it, because it is (...) rooted in deep inconsistencies in Socrates’ principles and character. In the course of reaching a conclusion that most scholars have striven to avoid I review and dispute the major strategies on resolving the contradiction: that it is only apparent, because one of the views is not (unqualifiedly) Socrates’ or a sophisticated analysis of the rhetorical purposes of the dialogues eliminates any contradiction. (shrink)

Considerable scholarship over the last dozen years has greatly increased our understanding of Apology and Crito. However, the knottiest problem between these dialogues--the frequently noted apparent contradiction between Apology 29c-30c and Crito 51b-c, between Socrates’ pledge to disobey a court order to give up philosophy and his argument that legal authority absolutely obligates a citizen to obedience--is far from being resolved. In the end I argue that this contradiction is unresolved, despite numerous ingenious attempts to eliminate it, because it is (...) rooted in deep inconsistencies in Socrates’ principles and character. In the course of reaching a conclusion that most scholars have striven to avoid I review and dispute the major strategies on resolving the contradiction: that it is only apparent, because one of the views is not (unqualifiedly) Socrates’ or a sophisticated analysis of the rhetorical purposes of the dialogues eliminates any contradiction. (shrink)

Considerable scholarship over the last dozen years has greatly increased our understanding of Apology and Crito. However, the knottiest problem between these dialogues--the frequently noted apparent contradiction between Apology 29c-30c and Crito 51b-c, between Socrates’ pledge to disobey a court order to give up philosophy and his argument that legal authority absolutely obligates a citizen to obedience--is far from being resolved. In the end I argue that this contradiction is unresolved, despite numerous ingenious attempts to eliminate it, because it is (...) rooted in deep inconsistencies in Socrates’ principles and character. In the course of reaching a conclusion that most scholars have striven to avoid I review and dispute the major strategies on resolving the contradiction: that it is only apparent, because one of the views is not (unqualifiedly) Socrates’ or a sophisticated analysis of the rhetorical purposes of the dialogues eliminates any contradiction. (shrink)

It might appear that apologists for legal systems should have a more difficult time justifying particular acts of civil disobedience than do anarchist critics of legal systems. But while this might be so for law breaking simpliciter, I argue that it is not so for civilly disobedient law breaking. The logic of morally justifying civil disobedience is remarkably similar for both legal apologists and anarchists, and diverges only on the question of accepting punishment for one's acts. But even here what (...) it is obligatory upon either to do is remarkably similar. Where differences in how civil disobedience is justified begin to arise is on the question of accepting punishment for breaking the law. For readily discernible reasons this is a strict obligation for legal apologists; for anarchists, however, it is but a contingent obligation. Nonetheless, in practice anarchists who engage in civil disobedience will find themselves under an obligation to suffer punishment. Essentially this is because doing so is necessary in order that the act of civil disobedience be an effective one, and like everyone else, anarchists have an obligation to try to be effective in the actions they undertake to remedy injustice. The paper concludes with offering two reasons why even anarchists ought to risk submitting to punishment by illegitimate authority by engaging in civil disobedience. (shrink)